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DOES AID TRANSLATE INTO BILATERAL TRADE? 
FINDINGS FOR RECIPIENT COUNTRIES 
  
Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann D. , Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso,  






This paper uses the gravity model of trade to investigate the link between foreign aid and 
exports in recipient countries. Most of the theoretical work emphasizes the negative impact of 
aid on recipient countries’ exports primarily due to exchange rate appreciation, disregarding 
possible positive effects of aid in overcoming supply bottlenecks and promoting bilateral 
trade relations. Our empirical findings -all based on endogeneity-proof techniques (such as 
Dynamic OLS or more refined techniques) - depend very strongly on whether bilateral trade 
relations and  autocorrelation of the disturbances are controlled for. When not controlling for 
these phenomena, the impact of aid is quite substantial (especially in Asia, Latin America & 
Caribbean) but when sound estimation techniques are applied the net impact of aid on 
recipient countries’ exports becomes insignificant in the full 130-country sample and the sub-
samples: Sub-Saharan Africa & MENA, Asia and Latin America & the Caribbean. However, 
this rather disappointing finding is in line with the small macroeconomic impact of aid found 
in earlier studies.  
Key Words: International trade; foreign aid; recipient exports; bilateral trade relations 
JEL Classification: F10; F35   2
 
1. Introduction 
Both the Doha Development Round and the UN declaration on the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) emphasize the importance of trade development in developing countries 
(DCs), especially in the least developed countries (LDCs). In specific, Millennium 
Development Goal 8 (MDG8: “Develop a global partnership for development”) is concerned 
with a far better participation of developing countries in international trade through improved 
access to developed countries’ markets and an active improvement of production and export 
capabilities in developing countries by means of official development assistance (ODA), 
especially Aid for Trade (AfT) measures.
1 In this context, foreign aid is also seen as a means 
to alleviate the lack of net capital inflows to least developed countries (LCDs) and to 
overcome severe supply-side constraints (physical and social infrastructure, insufficient 
capabilities in agriculture, manufacturing and services).  
Since trade liberalization talks in the Doha Development Round ask for mutual 
concessions, on the side of developing countries concessions to liberalize their imports 
depend on an expected benefit, such as an increase of their exports. If this latter effect existed, 
this would imply a more positive assessment of bilateral aid.  
It is therefore of utmost importance to study the impact of aid
2 on developing 
countries’ exports to see whether aid is  indeed an appropriate means to promote the 
production of export goods and thus enhance an export-led development which in turn could 
decrease aid-dependency of developing countries.
3 Also donors are more and more interested 
                                                           
1 Aid for trade is part of ODA (about 20 percent) and includes 1) technical trade assistance, 2) trade-related 
infrastructure and 3) capacity-building to improve production and export capacities. The idea of giving AfT 
dates back to the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and  has become an interesting feature of world trade rounds, 
especially since the Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong in 2005. The original motivation was to grant 
AfT in return for the trade concessions made in trade liberalization agreements. 
2 In particular bilateral aid. 
3 As we will show in the theoretical part of the study (Section 2), capital inflows in the form of development aid 
may have positive and negative effects on recipient countries’ exports and it is up to empirical investigations to 
determine which of the effects prevails.  
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in aid effectiveness having agreed on an increase of their aid-to-GDP ratio to 0.7 percent by 
2015, which would imply for donors like Germany a doubling of the current ratio.  
 
In this paper, we will rely on a bilateral trade model as we focus on bilateral trade 
relations between donors and recipient countries and, in particular, on aid’s impact on reci-
pient countries’ exports. We will utilize an augmented gravity model with the usual control 
variables (Bergstrand, 1985, 1989 and 1990; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Nelson and 
Juhasz Silva, 2008; Johansson and Pettersson, 2009), adding the bilateral exchange rate to 
control for changes in competitiveness between trading partners and utilizing endogeneity- 
proof estimation techniques. Since our analysis is based on  a bilateral trade model, our focus 
is on the impact of bilateral aid (from one or several sources to a specific recipient). The 
reasons why we think bilateral aid should be strongly related to bilateral trade are twofold: 
bilateral aid not only enhances bilateral trade through reputation, mutual trust and support,  
goodwill and familiarity between trading partners of the North and the South (Arvin and 
Baum, 1997; Arvin and Choudry, 1997; Johansson and Pettersson, 2009), but also through 
more visible things such as the creation of customer relations, distribution channels and a 
better adaptation to the formal and informal market environment (Johansson and Pettersson, 
2009).
4   
We add to the existing literature by firstly applying panel time series estimation 
techniques that have special advantages when the right hand side variables are endogenous 
which turns out to be the case in our sample. By means of a Granger causality test we find 
that, in the long run, aid  (our main variable of concern) and recipient countries’ exports are 
                                                           
4 Johansson and Pettersson (2009) argue that an intensified aid relation works to reduce the effective cost of 
geographic distance thus reducing the ‘distance’-coefficient, whereas we argue that an intensified aid relation 
makes aid more efficient thus increasing the ‘bilateral aid’-coefficient.  
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inter-linked
5 (bi-directional relation between aid and exports) implying that either more aid is 
given to countries with a poor export performance because donors want to promote 
development in recipient countries or that more aid is given to successful exporters because 
donors wish to reward  recipient countries’ export efforts of the past. In particular, we apply 
modern long-run panel estimation techniques (Dynamic Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(DFGLS)) that allow us not only to take the time series properties of the series into account 
and to  exogenize the right hand side variables but also to control for autocorrelation
6  so that 
consistent and efficient results can be generated. Especially the control for endogeneity that 
was either  IV –based or based on lags (GMM) in the past was not without weaknesses in the 
presence of poor instruments or in the presence of autocorrelation of the disturbances. 
Besides, control for autocorrelation is of utmost importance since autocorrelation reflects an 
omitted variable problem very often. 
Secondly, we consider crowding out effects between different types of aid and in 
particular, by studying whether aid only promotes trade with the donor at the expense of other 
countries, or whether it promotes overall trade. We consider three different types of aid: first, 
bilateral aid of a single donor-recipient pair with a supposedly very high positive impact on 
bilateral trade relations, second, bilateral aid of the rest of the donors to a single recipient with 
a possibly trade-diverting  (negative) impact on an existing bilateral trade relation, and third, 
multilateral aid to a single recipient with supposedly no impact on existing bilateral trade 
relations. In contrast to studies by Clemens et al. (2004), Reddy and Minoiu (2006), 
Johansson and Pettersson (2009) and Minoiu and Reddy (2010), who look at economically 
different types of aid (development aid versus non-development aid, technical assistance, aid 
for trade etc.), we stick to aggregated aid. We find justification for doing so in a study by 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and Johansson and Pettersson (2009) who actually do not find 
                                                           
5 In the short run, in contrast, the Granger causality test indicates that aid is exogenous and not inter-linked with 
exports. 
6 Through control of autocorrelation of the error terms the omitted variable bias is also attenuated.   5
larger (aid-elasticity) coefficients for development aid, technical assistance or aid for trade 
than for aggregated aid.  The fungibility of aid is another reason why we think aid is not really 
project-or program-specific and therefore we will not be able to gain new insights by studying 
disaggregated aid (Morrissey, 2006).     
 
In our model, an important underlying assumption concerning bilateral trade relations 
is that developing countries’ exports to industrialized countries might be more advantageous 
than exports to equally developing countries and therefore deserve special support and 
attention. The benefit from exporting to industrialized countries’ markets is said to be due to 
an enhanced learning from exporting to those markets. Positive effects from exporting are 
related to knowledge spillovers, improvements of product quality, management, marketing 
and transport capabilities etc. A further advantage from exporting to markets of industrialized 
countries are productivity increases through enhanced competition, economies of scale 
through a conquest of well-funded donor markets and eventually the alleviation of the capital 
and the foreign exchange constraint. 
Interestingly, the results concerning the impact of aid on recipient exports in an 
augmented gravity model framework are dependent on the estimation technique chosen., in 
particular the treatment of bilateral effects and of omitted variables.  
Utilizing “second best” estimation techniques that control for endogeneity (but not  for 
the role played by bilateral trade relations and omitted variables), we find  that the increase in 
recipients’ exports induced by donors’ direct bilateral aid  is quite noticeable. In this setting 
we observe an increase in exports of about US$ 2.45 for every aid dollar received in the 
overall sample of 130 recipient countries.  Aid’s average impact on recipient countries is US$ 
5.56 per $ of aid in Asia and US$ 4.14 Latin America & the Caribbean, but only US$ 0.41 in 
Africa.    6
However, this evidence is questioned by the application of “first best” estimation 
techniques! If we work with these more appropriate techniques that control for bilateral   
relations, endogeneity and autocorrelation, aid’s impact on recipient countries exports 
becomes insignificant.  
We must therefore acknowledge that aid does not have a direct impact on recipients’ 
exports. This finding is perfectly is in line with the very weak impact of aid found on 
macroeconomic variables. Aid impacts weakly, but positively on investment, negatively on 
domestic savings (crowding out effect) and negatively on the real exchange rate (appreciation 
of the real exchange rate). 
However, the evidence so far does not imply that aid does not impact on recipients 
exports in an indirect way. This effect might be captured in the bilateral fixed effects (dyadic 
effects)  that  reflect the average quality of bilateral (trade, entrepreneurial or diplomatic)  
relations.  
 
Section 2 summarizes the transmission channels related to the aid-export link. Section 
3 presents a description of the data. Section 4 explains the model specification and discusses 
the main results. Section 5 presents a number of robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 outlines 
some conclusions.   7
 
2. The aid-export link: the conceptual framework 
2.1 The augmented gravity model of trade 
Solid theoretical foundations that provide a consistent base for an empirical analysis of 
bilateral trade relations have been developed in the past three decades by Anderson (1979), 
Bergstrand (1985, 1989 and 1990), Helpman (1987), Deardorff (1998), Feenstra et al. (2001), 
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003, Feenstra (2004), Haveman and Hummels (2004) and 
Redding and Venables (2004). They are based on the gravity model of trade, which enables 
the evaluation and quantification of the impact on exports of a variety of factors related to 
trade frictions. Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW) contributed to this literature by an   
appropriate modelling of trade costs. The AvW model has been recently extended to 
applications explicitly involving developed and less developed countries by Nelson and 
Juhasz Silva (2008). They present an extension of AvW to the asymmetric north-south case 
and derive some implications related to the effect of aid on trade.  
 
According to the underlying theory of the gravity model, trade between two countries 
is explained by nominal incomes and the populations of the trading countries, by the distance 
between the economic centers of the exporter and importer, and by a number of trade 
impediment and facilitation variables. Dummy variables such as former colony, common 
language, and common border are generally used to proxy for these factors. The gravity 
model has been widely used to investigate the role played by specific policy or geographical 
variables in explaining bilateral trade flows. Consistent with this approach and in order to 
investigate the effect of development aid on recipient countries’ exports, we augment the 
traditional model with bilateral exchange rates, bilateral aid (ODA), from a specific donor and 
the rest of the donors to a recipient country and with imputed multilateral aid. The augmented 
gravity model is specified as   8
ijt ij ijt ijt jt ijt ij jt it jt it ijt u F XCHR MAID BAIDI BAID DIST YHR YHD YR YD X 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0
           
             
(1)                        
 
where t stands for year. Xijt are the exports to donor i from recipient j in period t in current 
US$;  YDi (YRj) indicates the GDPs
7 of the donor (recipient), YHDi (YHRj) are donor 
(recipient) GDPs per capita and DISTij is the geographical distance between countries i and j. 
BAID ij is bilateral net official development aid from donor i to country j in current US$ and 
one has to be aware that it could also be an indicator of bilateral trade relations. BAIDIj is 
bilateral net ODA from all the other donors (excluding i) to recipient j and MAIDij is imputed 
multilateral development aid from donor i to country j in current US$. The rational of adding 
the latter two variables is to control for cross-correlation effects due to the fact that other 
donors’ aid could promote their own imports from recipient j and may have a negative effect 
on recipient country’s j exports/donor’s i imports.  XCHRijt denotes nominal bilateral 
exchange rates
8 in units of local currency of country i (donor) per unit of currency in country j 
(recipient) in year t (indexed so that XCHR=100 in base year 2000). Finally, Fij denotes other 
factors impeding or facilitating trade (e.g., former colony, common language, or a common 
border). 
In Equation 2 time and country-by-country fixed effects are incorporated.  Taking 
logarithms the basic specification of the gravity model is 
ijt ij dummies ijt LXCHR ijt LMAID jt LBAIDI ijt LBAID
ij LDIST jt LYHR it LYHD jt LYR it LYD ij t ijt LX
     
       
     
       
'
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
                           ( 2 )  
where:  
                                                           
7 We utilize GDP and not GNP in order to avoid a double-counting of income received by third countries 
(international transfer payments, such as aid). 
8 When the gravity model is estimated using panel data it is recommended to add bilateral exchange rates also as 
a control variable (Carrère, 2006).   9
L denotes variables in natural logs.  t   are specific time effects that control for omitted 
variables common to all trade flows but which vary over time. Later on in our estimations we 
will drop the time dummies, since time fixed effects and Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS) routines are not compatible. A look at the Durbin-Watson statistic, however,   
indicates that FGLS is called for.  ij   are trading-partner fixed effects that proxy for bilateral 
trade relations and multilateral resistance factors. When these effects are included, the 
influence of the variables that are time invariant cannot be directly estimated. This would be 
the case for distance, contiguity, common language and colony  in a fixed effects model of 
bilateral trade.  
The model will be estimated for data on 21 donor and 130 recipient countries during 
the period from 1988 to 2007. 
 
2.2 Transmission channels from aid to bilateral exports   
While it is possible to study the “prima facie” impact of foreign aid on exports by means of 
export equations based on an augmented gravity model (treating aid as an income transfer or 
as a temporary increase in income), it is not possible to identify the transmission channels 
from development aid to bilateral exports within this framework.  
 
First of all there might be an unquantifiable/unobservable transmission channel. If aid 
is strongly correlated with unquantifiable and/or unobservable variables such as improved 
trade relations (through mutual trust and support, familiarity and goodwill), it is statistically 
/econometrically impossible to separate these effects from the effect of the aid variable. In this 
case, the transmission channel between bilateral aid and bilateral exports would be that aid 
promotes “bilateral trade relations” and we would expect that in this case aid not only   
promotes donor country exports, but also recipient countries’ exports. If we include only 
bilateral aid (LBAID) into the model (eq. 3), assuming bilateral exports (LXijt ) to be only a   10
function of bilateral aid (LBAIDijt) and some standard controls) but not bilateral trade relations 
(LBTR), which are highly correlated with bilateral aid, then the  coefficient measures the 
composite impact of both bilateral aid and bilateral aid relations ( 2 1      ) and will 
therefore have an upward bias. If , on the other hand, bilateral trade relations do not change 
much over time their effect will be incorporated in  ij  , the bilateral  (dyadic; country-by- 
country) fixed effect and   will measure the direct impact of bilateral aid on recipients’ 
exports. 
 
ijt k control k control ijt LBAID ij t ijt LX                ... 1 1 0                                      
(3) 
 
However, even if we had time series data on bilateral trade relations, the true model 
(eq. 4) below could not be estimated due to the strong correlation between LBAID and LBTR. 
ijt k control k control ijt LBTR ijt LBAID ij t ijt LX                  ... 1 1 2 1 0            (4) 
 
Besides, there are macroeconomic transmission channels. The gravity framework 
captures the supply-side effect of aid resulting in an income effect and later in a production 
and export effect. Its demand-side effect (Dutch disease effect) is reflected in the exchange 
rate, which enters the gravity model as a control variable. The exchange rate effect of aid 
being incorporated into the exchange rate-vector cannot be disentangled from the overall 
exchange rate effect. To learn more about the indirect impact of development aid, we will 
therefore briefly describe its macroeconomic transmission channels. 
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2.3 Transmission channels from aid to exports (to the world) 
More recent studies on the income effect of aid (i.e. the overall macroeconomic impact of aid, 
as measured by the impact of aid on the level of per capita income or growth) have shown  the 
impact of aid on economic development to be  statistically insignificant (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008; Nowak-Lehmann D. et al., 2009; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2005, 2008 
and 2010). The main arguments used are: (1)  lack of a cointegrating relationship between aid 
and growth (Nowak-Lehmann D. et al.), (2) the statistical insignificance of the aid-growth 
relationship when looking at hundreds of studies by way of a meta analysis (Doucouliagos 
and Paldam) or (3) the missing robustness and insignificance of the aid–growth coefficients 
when running regressions over different samples, different time horizons, different time 
periods and utilizing different types of aid (Rajan and Subramanian). In addition, the study of 
Nowak-Lehmann D. et al. even argues that  development aid and the level of per capita 
income are not sufficiently related in the long run. This is said to be due to an unstable 
cointegrating relationship.
9  
As for the specific macroeconomic channels at work, we can think of aid as having an 
investment- and a savings-effect. Part of the aid transfer will be consumed and part of it will 
be saved and invested. In the medium to long term we therefore expect a supply-side impact 
of aid-financed public expenditure. Public investment in infrastructure generates productivity 
spillovers and can also provide for a learning-by-doing externality (Adam and Bevan, 2006).  
The investment effect which is derived from a multiplicative model can be tested as 
follows: 
jt jt jt jt jt LAIDY LEXTNSY LDYS LINVY           3 2 1 j                           (5)       
where all variables are in logs. j stands for recipient country j and t stands for time.  jt INVY  is 
the investment-to-GDP ratio in recipient country j at time t.  DSY is the domestic savings-to-
                                                           
9 Different cointegration tests (Kao’s, Pedroni’s and Johansen’s) came to different conclusions. The Pedroni-test 
rejected the existence of a cointegrating relationship, whereas the Kao and the Johansen-based tests found one or 
several cointegrating vectors.   12
GDP ratio, EXTSNY is net external savings (minus aid) -to- GDP and  AIDY is the net aid-to-
GDP ratio. 
The impact of foreign aid on domestic savings can be tested by means of the following 
equation: 
jt jt jt j jt LAIDY LEXTSNY LDSY         2 1                                      (6) 
Note that the impact on total savings-to-GDP is 
jt jt jt jt DSY EXTSNY AIDY TSY        . 
As for the third macroeconomic channel, monetary trade theory emphasizes the anti-
export bias (Dutch disease effect) stemming from net capital inflows in general and from 
development aid in specific (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). This anti-export bias is caused 
by an appreciation of the real exchange rate (LXCHR) and is considered as a demand-side 
effect that arises in the short run (Adam and Bevan, 2006). In a fixed exchange rate system 
the real appreciation results from an increase of the monetary base, the money supply and 
eventually an increase in the prices of non-tradables (price of tradables remain unaltered in 
the small country case). In a flexible exchange rate system the real appreciation of the 
exchange rate results from the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate due to capital 
inflows in the form of foreign aid. The real appreciation of the exchange rate hurts the 
producers of export and import substitution goods, but makes the production of non-tradables 
more profitable. Therefore in the medium to long run, resources will flow into the non-
tradable sector and this sector will expand. As imports become cheaper, imports will rise 
which will lead to trade deficits thus causing a pro-import bias. Spending development aid on 
imports (preferably on capital goods and intermediates) will partly reverse this appreciation 
effect. The effect of development aid on the real economy therefore depends on the amount of 
development aid (capital inflow) and the share that is spent on tradables (imports) and non-
tradables (transport, construction, telecommunication, energy). It has to be kept in mind   13
though that a clever exchange rate management in the recipient country can crucially 
influence the real exchange rate. 
The effect of net capital flows on the real exchange rate can be modelled as follows:  
jt jt jt j jt LAIDY LEXTNSY LXCHR         2 1                                                                  (7) 
 
2.4 Existing empirical findings on the aid-export link (the non-bilateral approach) 
Studies on an aid-export link for recipient countries are very scarce. The export measure in 
those studies is not bilateral exports, but exports of a recipient country j to the world. Studies 
with the export-to-GDP ratio as dependent variable and the aid-to-GDP ratio and covariates as 
explanatory variables (Munemo et al., 2007; Kang et al., 2010) reveal mixed empirical 
findings.  
Munemo and his co-authors apply FE-IV estimation techniques to a sample of 84 
developing countries (unbalanced panel) and find a positive and significant relationship 
between aid and exports. They find a non-linear effect (diminishing returns) of aid in the 
period 1980-2003. However, in a sample of 72 recipient countries (balanced panel) this 
relationship becomes statistically insignificant. Running regressions on the LDCs (32 
countries) they find a positive and significant but linear relationship, and for low income 
African economies (33 countries) the relationship is significant, positive but non-linear. 
Khan and co-authors present results for 30 recipient countries utilizing data for the 
period 1966-2002. Applying the heterogenous panel vector-autoregression, they find a 
positive relationship between aid and exports for 13 countries and a negative relationship for 
17 countries. 
When studying the relationship between exports to the world-to-GDP ratio and aid-to-
GDP ratio, the authors observe on average a negative relationship in a sample of 28 countries 
in the period 1979-2004. This relationship is linear and significant. These results are based on   14
a fixed effects model and dynamic OLS estimation controlling for endogeneity and serial 
correlation of the disturbances (DFGLS). 
 
3. Description of the data sources and the data on aid  
3.1 Data sources 
Official Development Aid data are from the OECD Development Database on Aid from DAC 
Members. We consider net ODA disbursements in current US$
10, instead of aid commitments, 
because we are interested in the funds actually released to the recipient countries in a given 
year. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or the 
transfer of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor.  
The original member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Bilateral exports are obtained from the OECD online database (International Trade and 
Balance of Payments Statistics). Data on income and population variables are drawn from the 
World Bank (World Development Indicators Database, 2009). Bilateral exchange rates are 
from the IMF statistics which have been corrected for the introduction of the euro and 
currency reforms in the recipient countries
11. Distances between capitals have been computed 
as great-circle distances using data on straight-line distances in kilometres, latitudes and 
longitudes. They are from the CIA World Fact Book. Trade impeding or promoting factors 
such as being a former colony, sharing a common language or a common border are taken 
from the CEPII data base (http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/fdi.htm). 
 
 
                                                           
10 The gross amount comprises total grants and concessional loans extended (according to DAC criteria for 
concessional loans). 
11 The IFS and WDI statistics are not adjusted for currency reforms and therefore very problematic. The data had 
to be corrected by the authors.   15
3.2 Net ODA, our measure of aid 
The aid given by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members is reported as 
official development aid (ODA) and other official flows (OOF). OOF are other official sector 
transactions which do not meet ODA criteria
12 and are therefore disregarded in our analysis.  
The aid data contains the bilateral transactions as well the multilateral contributions. The 
former are undertaken by a donor country directly with an aid recipient and the latter are 
contributions of international agencies and organizations. The recipients include not only 
countries and territories but also multilateral organizations that are also ODA eligible. 
The total net ODA disbursements, the aid data we will work with, are the sum of 
grants, capital subscriptions, total net loans and other long-term capital. The grants include 
debt forgiveness and interest subsidies in associated financing packages. The capital 
subscriptions to multilateral organizations are made in the form of notes and similar 
instruments unconditionally convertible at sight by the recipient institutions. Loans and other 
long-term capital include the total disbursements of ODA loans and equity investment. Total 
net loans and other long term capital represent the loans extended minus repayment received 
and offsetting entries for debt relief. Technical co-operation, development food aid and the 
emergency aid are included in grants and gross loans. 
Figure 1 shows the five largest recipients of net ODA in the 1980-2007 period. Iraq is 
the largest recipient followed by Egypt, China and Indonesia. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
                                                           
12 For example, grants to aid recipients for representational or essentially commercial purposes, official bilateral 
transactions intended to promote development but having a grant element of less than 25 per cent or official 
bilateral transactions, whatever their grant element, that are primarily export-facilitating in purpose ("official 
direct export credits").  Net acquisitions by governments and central monetary institutions of securities issued by 
multilateral development banks at market terms, subsidies (grants) to the private sector to soften its credits to aid 
recipients, funds in support of private investment are also classified as OOF. 
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Figure 2 shows that net ODA disbursement have been quite volatile over the 1988-
2007 period. The signing of the UN-Declaration of the Millennium Development goals in 
2000 will certainly help to push up net ODA disbursements in the future. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 illustrates that countries involved in conflicts or civil wars (Congo, Rwanda, 
Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan) or countries plagued by 
natural disasters (Nicaragua) received huge amounts of ODA in the 1988-2007 period. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
3.3 Our aid variables entering the model 
We will concentrate on net ODA and within this category on three types of aid: First, bilateral 
net ODA (aid) of a donor i to a recipient country j (BAID), second, the sum of bilateral aid 
given by all donors (except i) to j (BAIDI) and third, multilateral aid (MAID) given by donor i 
to developing country j  (which is the share country j receives approximately through a 
multilateral institution that is fuelled by donor country i; the donor remains unknown to the 
recipient and vice versa). 
 
The idea of utilizing BAID, BAIDI and MAID is the following: With BAID we aim at 
measuring also the importance of bilateral trade relations between country pairs ij, with 
BAIDI we wish to check whether other donors disturb an existing bilateral trade relation 
between ij and with MAID we wish to find a proxy for the efficiency of aid in the absence of 
bilateral trade relations.    17
Multilateral aid (in the sense of multilateral contributions of international agencies and 
organizations (also part of ODA)) can be imputed back to the funders of those bodies. The 
OECD uses a specific methodology that we briefly explain. The approach will vary depending 
on whether the intention is to show the share of the receipts of a given recipient attributable to 
a particular donor, or the share of a given donor’s outflows that can be assigned to an 
individual recipient. As DAC statistics are primarily designed to measure donor effort, the 
second approach is the one taken in DAC statistical presentations. First, the percentage of 
each multilateral agency’s total annual gross disbursements that each recipient country 
receives is calculated. This calculation is carried out only in respect of agencies’ 
disbursements of grants or concessional (ODA) loans from core resources. Then, the recipient 
percentages derived in the first step are multiplied by a donor's contribution in the same year 
to the core resources of the agency concerned to arrive at the imputed flow from that donor to 
each recipient. 
13  This calculation is repeated for each multilateral agency. The results from 
the second step for all agencies are summed to obtain the total imputed multilateral aid from 
each donor to each recipient country.   
 
4.  Model specification, estimations  and main results 
4.1  Model specification and estimation issues 
As we are primarily interested in the long-term effect of development aid on recipients’ 
exports we utilize a long-run model. Since our data consists of a time span of a maximum of 
20 years and a cross-section of 130 countries, we test for the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. The results of the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and the 
LR test for heteroskedasticity indicate that both problems are present in the data. Given the 
                                                           
13 An example:  In a given year, WFP provides 10% of its disbursements from core resources to Sudan.  Donor A 
contributes USD 50 million to WFP core resources in the same year.  Donor A’s imputed multilateral ODA to 
Sudan through WFP is 0.1*50million = USD 5 million.   18
strong rejection of the null in both tests, the model is estimated by FGLS controlling for 
autocorrelation and by applying heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. 
In a first step, the long-run model is estimated for the full sample (130 countries). The 
long-run model does not describe the stage of transition and therefore does not contain lags of 
the covariates in levels since all adjustments have come to an end in the long term. However, 
it controls for endogeneity of the right hand side variables by inserting leads and lags of the 
explanatory variables in first differences.
14 As a prerequisite the series have to be non-
stationary and co-integrated. In our case they are all integrated of order one (I(1)) and 
cointegrated according to Kao’s residual conitegration test (see Tables A2 and A3 in the 
appendix for test results). 
In general terms, the model is estimated by restricting the coefficients of the right hand 
side variables to be equal for each aid recipient. This way we get an average measure of the 
impact of different types of aid on bilateral exports.  
We estimate three variants of the model: (1) without dyadic  ij   (bilateral fixed 
effects), to be estimated by DOLS (column 1); (2) without dyadic  ij    (bilateral fixed effects), 
to be estimated by DFGLS (column 2); (3) with dyadic, fixed effects  ij   , to be estimated by 
DFGLS. The DOLS procedure goes back to Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993) 
and allows controlling for endogeneity of the explanatory variables. As we also control for 
autocorrelation of the error terms, we eventually estimate the model by means of panel 
dynamic feasible generalized least squares (DFGLS) in column 2 (with common intercept) 
and in column 3 with dyadic fixed effects. Individual (country-pair) effects (dyadic effects 
ij  ) are assumed to be fixed and are considered as unobservable heterogeneous effects across 
trading partners. They are assumed not to vary over time. Those effects are also a proxy for 
the so-called “multilateral resistance” factors modelled by Anderson and van Wincoop 
                                                           
14 It requires the series to be non-stationary and cointegrated in the long-run. Both the panel ADF-unit root test 
and Kao’s cointegration tests supported these premises.   19
(2003).  ij   stand for the autonomous rise or fall in exports to donor countries through time-
invariant factors that characterize the bilateral donor-recipient relationship. 
The model with the common intercepts assumes the bilateral  fixed effects to be the 
same for all country pairs. This assumption is of course very restrictive. Testing common 
bilateral versus heterogeneous bilateral ( ij  ) effects clearly showed that individual bilateral 
effects effects are called for. Our preferred estimation equation is therefore (equation 8 whose 
estimation results will be presented in column 3) which takes the existence of bilateral 
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However, the results presented in Table 1 (column 3) might underestimate the impact 
of variables that change with the country pairs (i,j) over time. In particular, the impact of 
bilateral development aid might be underestimated. In contrast, the results presented in Table 
1 (column 2) might overestimate the impact of variables that change with the country pairs 
(i,j) over time and might therefore overestimate the impact of bilateral aid. 
  
In a second step, the model is estimated for different regions of the developing world 
without and with dyadic fixed effects applying the DOLS and the DFGLS procedure.   20
 
4.2. Main results 
4.2.1 Findings for the full 130-country sample  
Table 1 reports the main estimation results that are relevant in the long run. We start by 
reporting the pooled Dynamic OLS (DOLS) results (column 1). This estimation method 
indicates quite a high, positive impact of bilateral aid on recipient exports (a one dollar 
increase in bilateral aid increases recipient exports by US$ 2.45)
15. However, the results have 
to be interpreted with caution as they disregard heterogeneous bilateral trade relations and 
autocorrelation of the error terms. If both problems are present the estimation results will be 
biased and inefficient. Only endogeneity is controlled for by inserting the leads and lags of the 
explanatory variables in first differences. The Durbin-Watson statistic being 0.28 is very poor 
indicating that there is something wrong with the model specification. 
Column 2 of Table 1 contains the pooled DFGLS results neglecting country-bb-
country fixed effects, but controlling for autocorrelation. What we see is that the impact of 
bilateral aid between country i and j becomes strongly reduced. A one dollar increase of aid 
now leads to only a US$ 0.86 increase in exports. The Durbin-Watson statistic is now 2.29 
and has substantially improved but the test on individual (heterogeneous) bilateral fixed 
effects rejected the common (homogeneous) bilateral effects specification of this model. 
The third column of Table 1 which is based on our preferred estimation technique 
shows the FE-DFGLS results. By controlling for bilateral trade relations  ij  , aid’s impact on 
bilateral exports becomes even insignificant.  
 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                           
15 The monetary impact of bilateral aid is calculated according to the following formula:  
Coefficient BAID= MEAN of X/MEAN of BAID, i.e. 0.20*271000000/22100000 =  US $ 2.45   21
As to our variable of interest “bilateral aid /bilateral trade relations (LBAID)”, 
controlling for autocorrelation via DFGLS does change and strongly reduce the positive 
impact of the aid variables on recipients’ export trade (compare the DFGLS results of column 
2 to the DOLS results in column 1): A one dollar increase in bilateral aid increases recipient 
exports by US$ 2.45 in column 1 and by US$ 0.86 in column 2
16. The contribution of US$ 
2.45 - being the average contribution of aid to exports in our 130 countries sample – seems 
quite implausible given the low macroeconomic impact of aid (shown in Table 6).  When not 
controlling for county-by-county (individual bilateral) fixed  effects (Table 1 column 1 and 2) 
LBAID seems to become a catch-all variable, i.e. it captures the effect of bilateral trade 
relations  which are assumed not to change over time and all other omitted variables (e.g. 
changes in trade relations over time) that are highly correlated with bilateral aid from donor i 
to recipient j . Please note that omitted variables (such as mutual trust and support, familiarity 
and goodwill) are sometimes hard to observe and hard to quantify so that the role of bilateral 
trade relations for bilateral trade cannot be determined. However, if we apply our preferred 
model specification and do not neglect the potential positive or negative effects of bilateral 
trade relations on recipients’ exports,  the pure (direct) effect of bilateral aid on recipients’ 
exports becomes insignificant (Table 1, column 3).  
This new finding -based on appropriate econometric methods- challenges  our belief 
that an increase in LBAID should have a discernible positive impact on recipients’ exports. 
Our view is supported by Johansson and Pettersson (2009) and Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2010) 
who observed an increase of donors’ exports to recipient countries supposedly due to 
improved trade relations. In the same vain, it could then be argued that increased aid goes 
hand in hand with good trade relations which will eventually strengthen and promote   
recipients’ exports to the donor countries. If this is the case, one might conclude that aid 
                                                           
16 The monetary impact of bilateral aid is calculated according to the following formula:  
Coefficient BAID= MEAN of X/MEAN of BAID, i.e. 0.07*271000000/22100000 =  US $ 0.86.   22
impacts indirectly and positively on recipients’ exports. If trade relations do not matter, then 
aid will not have any impact (neither direct nor indirect) according to our findings. 
 
To comment on the other variables influencing recipients’ exports: Bilateral aid given 
by other donors (LBAIDI)  has a small negative  effect on the exports of a specific donor-
recipient pair and therefore reduces the effect of bilateral aid in a specific recipient country a 
little bit (Table 1, column 3). Multilateral aid (bilaterally computed) given by international 
organizations (LMAID) has an insignificant impact on recipient countries exports.. So overall 
we observe very small crowding out effects from aid given by other donors in the full 130 
sample. This implies that when other donors give higher amounts of aid, the “goodwill” and 
“habit formation” factors mentioned above could vanish and decrease recipients’ exports 
generating an indirect negative effect on a specific recipient’s exports.  
Most of the other variables present the expected sign and are statistically significant. 
The coefficients of donors’ and recipients’ income are positive and significant and around the 
theoretical value of unity. The coefficient of donors’ income per capita is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in most specifications, whereas the coefficient of  
recipients’ income per capita is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level in 
all specifications. The impact of the bilateral nominal exchange rate is not significant. One 
could have expected a negative sign (implying that an increase (appreciation of the recipient 
country’s currency) reduces recipient countries’ exports to the respective donor country).  
The effect of distance is negative as expected (Table 1, column 1 and 2). The dummy 
variables  (common language and former colony)  have the expected positive sign. The 
variables distance, contiguity, common language and former colony drop out when 
heterogeneous fixed effects are included. 
    23
4.2.2  Findings for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) & MENA , SSA, Asia and Latin America 
& the Caribbean 
We further tested whether the results were similar across different regions of the world. Our 
hypothesis that Africa including MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa would fare worse than Latin 
America or Asia found support in the data, but only if we do not control for heterogeneous 
bilateral trade relations and omitted variables/autocorrelation of the disturbances. In Table 2-
5, column 1 we see huge differences of the long-run coefficients of bilateral aid from donor i 
to recipient j and the average impact of this type of bilateral aid on recipient exports. In Africa 
including MENA countries aid’s impact on these exports into donor countries is  rather low. 
One dollar of aid increases Sub-Saharan & MENA exports by US$ 0.41 and SSA exports by 
US$ 0.31, whereas exports increase by US$ 5.56 in Asia and by US$ 4.41 in Latin America & 
the Caribbean for each dollar received as aid.  
However, if we utilize our preferred estimation method (Tables 2-5, column 3), 
bilateral aid has an insignificant impact on recipients’ exports. Our estimations (all controlling 
for endogeneity via FGLS and omitted variables) stand in contrast to the findings of 
Johansson and Pettersson (2009) who observe a positive impact of aid on recipients’ 
exports.
17 This divergence in findings could be due to the leads and lags-approach to control 
for endogeneity of the right hand side variables, the insertion of bilateral fixed effects (dyadic 
effects, instead of donor  fixed and recipient fixed effects) and the FGLS-technique. The latter 
is called for in order to fulfil the requirements of the classical linear regression model. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
[Table 3 about here] 
[Table 4 about here] 
                                                           
17 Johansson and Petterson (2009) do not control for factors that have a bilateral component (such as the bilateral 
exchange rate, bilateral time-invariant relations ( ij  ) ). They neither mention the value of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic nor do they discuss the results in the Appendix when aid was instrumented.   24






4.2.3  Is the macroeconomic impact of aid in line with our findings? 
As for the transmission channels of aid on the macro-economy, economic theory indicated 
that development aid is associated with two different effects on exports. First, an income 
effect which will lead to an expansion of consumption and investment in the recipient 
country. Eventually productive capacity will also increase in the sector of exportables and the 
additional supply of exportables will be absorbed by the export markets (supply-side effect).
18 
Second, the income effect will also increase the demand for non-tradables thus leading to an 
appreciation of the exchange rate if this is not impeded by a strategic exchange rate 
management of the recipient country’s central bank (demand-side effect).  
In order to scrutinize the importance of macroeconomic transmission channels we 
checked those channels separately. We augmented eq. 5-7 by adding leads and lags of the 
regressors in first differences to control for endogeneity of all right-hand side variables. In 
addition we accounted for autocorrelation of the disturbances by applying the Feasible 
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18 The developing country is considered a small country that is unable to influence the price in the world market 
and foreign demand is considered as perfectly elastic.   25
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The results –based on DFGLS estimations- are summarized in Table 5 and a fictitious 
computation of a strong increase in aid has been performed. By means of this computation we 
find evidence that the macroeconomic impact of aid on the recipient country’s economy is 
very small. Assuming that the aid-to-GDP ratio doubles (from 5% to 10%) this would lead to 
a 7% increase in the investment-to GDP ratio (e.g. from 15% to about to 16.05%) and a 15% 
decrease in the domestic savings-to-GDP ratio (e.g. from 10% to 8.5%). The ratio ‘total 
savings-to-GDP”, however, would increase from 10% to 13.5 % (8.5%+5%), taking other 
external savings to be zero. The real exchange rate would appreciate by 3.5% if the aid-to-
GDP ratio increased by 10%.  
[Table 6 about here] 
Taken together, we find a small but significant positive impact on investment and a 
small but significant negative impact on domestic savings and the real exchange rate. This 
leads us to conclude that the effect of bilateral aid on bilateral exports (in Table 1) is in line 
with the rather weak income effect of aid, i.e. a macroeconomic improvement of  the recipient 
country’s economy which results in an insignificant impact of aid on recipients’ exports. 
Whether aid has an indirect impact on recipients’ exports via a strengthening of bilateral trade   26
relations which might go hand in hand with development aid cannot be empirically 
determined.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
Furthermore, we checked the robustness of the results by employing imports from donor 
countries (reported by importers as c.i.f. values) as dependent variable (the mirror statistics to 
exports reported by exporters as f.o.b. values).  The regression results basically did not change 
and stayed robust. We controlled for endogeneity of the explanatory variables via  dynamic 
ordinary least squares, which is the approach of Stock and Watson (1993). The Heckman 
approach, which was used to check for sample selection bias, gave inconclusive results 
depending on the selection variables chosen. At times it indicated no sample selection bias 
while in other specifications there clearly was a sample selection bias. This issue has to be 
settled in further research.
19 Helpman et al. (2008) find the selection bias to be economically 
neglible. This finding is corroborated by Johansson and Pettersson (2009). The results of the 
two-step estimation and the OLS estimation are very close together. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The empirical analysis showed that the direct impact of development aid on recipient 
countries exports is  insignificant on average. This finding is in line with the very small 
macroeconomic impact of development aid that we observed when we investigated the impact 
of development aid on investment, domestic savings and the real exchange rate. Besides, we 
could not determine -utilizing adequate estimation methods- whether development aid was 
more effective (in terms of recipients’ exports) in Asia and Latin America & the Caribbean  
than in Sub-Saharan Africa & MENA.  
                                                           
19 Results are available upon request.   27
Neither could we establish -by applying econometric techniques- whether 
development aid had an indirect and positive impact on recipients’ exports. We tended to 
believe that bilateral aid enhances bilateral trade relations and thus bilateral trade, but this 
effect could not  be made visible. All our findings taken together suggest that aid seems to be 
ineffective as a direct promoter of exports, but they do not rule out that aid might play an 
important indirect role in promoting bilateral trade relations.  
Next to this rather disappointing finding that on average bilateral aid had an   
insignificant impact  on recipients’ exports, we found some first evidence that in a few 
developing countries bilateral aid had a significant, positive impact on recipients’ exports. 
Further research shall determine which factors (country characteristics, type of aid received, 
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Figure 1. Ten largest recipients of net ODA (1988-2007) 
 
Source: OECD; own calculations. 







































































































Source: OECD; own calculations.   33
Figure 3. Net ODA as percentage of recipient countries GDP between 1988 and 2007 on 
average 
 
Source: OECD; own calculations.   34
Table 1. Development aid and recipients’ exports (all recipient countries)  
   Common Intercept-















LYD 0.76***  0.81***  0.70*** 
 (31.55)  (13.06)  (4.63) 
LYR 1.10***  1.09***  0.29** 
 (57.86)  (18.64)  (2.23) 
LYHD -2.92***  -2.75***  -0.56** 
 (-35.12)  (-15.06)  (-2.24) 
LYHR 0.36***  0.22*  1.10*** 
 (8.83)  (2.36)  (6.64) 
LDIST -0.71***  -0.70***  --- 
 (-19.35)  (-6.64)  --- 
LBAID 0.20***  0.07**  0.00 
 (13.19)  (2.36)  (0.15) 
LBAIDI 0.01  0.05  -0.09* 
 (0.45)  (0.75)  (-1.88) 
LMAID 0.00  0.00  0.00 
 (3.32)  (0.77)  (0.16) 
LXCHR -0.07  0.01  0.05 
 (-1.13)  (0.16)  (1.36) 
CONTIG -0.23*  -0.55 --- 
 (-1.77)  (-1.10)  --- 
COMLANG 0.65*** 0.65***  --- 
 (10.08)  (2.58)  --- 
COLONY 0.81***  0.92*** --- 
 (11.07)  (4.23)  --- 
  common intercept (yes)  common intercept (yes)  dyadic effects (yes
  leads and lags (yes)  leads and lags (yes)  leads and lags (yes
Impact of aid in 
terms of US$ 
(rounded) 
2.45 0.86 0.00 
      
R-squared  0.60  0.89  0.93           
N 14665  12558  12558 
Log likelihood   -31730.48  -18463.32  -15913.56 
Durbin-Watson-
Stat. 
0.28 2.29 2.01 
Note: t-values in parentheses. Leads and lags are not reported in DOLS and DFGLS. The impact of aid was 
calculated as:  LBAID* X / D I A B =  LBAID*271/22.1.  Exports and aid are in millions of  current US$.   35
Table 2. Development aid and recipients’ exports in Sub-Saharan Africa & MENA 
   Common Intercept-














LYD 0.91***  0.94***  0.21 
 (27.78)  (8.46)  (0.74) 
LYR 1.08***  0.98***  0.82*** 
 (20.35)  (6.67)  (3.46) 
LYHD -2.86***  -2.73***  -1.13** 
 (-23.07)  (-8.54)  (-2.01) 
LYHR 0.37***  0.20  0.71* 
 (5.04)  (1.04)  (1.64) 
LDIST -0.98***  -0.85***  --- 
 (-15.70)  (-4.55)  --- 
LBAID 0.08***  0.07  0.06 
 (4.60)  (1.21)  (1.31) 
LBAIDI -0.08  -0.04  -0.12 
 (-1.33)  (-0.30)  (-1.17) 
LMAID 0.04***  0.01*  0.01 
 (8.49)  (1.82)  (1.56) 
LXCHR -0.07  -0.01  0.03 
 (-0.92)  (-0.05)  (0.52) 
CONTIG --- ---  --- 
 ---  ---  --- 
COMLANG 0.98***  0.86**  --- 
 (9.90)  (2.23)  --- 
COLONY 1.15***  1.42*** --- 
 (9.70)  (3.15)  --- 
  common intercept (yes)  common intercept (yes)  dyadic effects (yes
  leads and lags (yes)  leads and lags (yes)  leads and lags (yes
Impact of aid in 
terms of US$ 
(rounded) 
0.41 0.00 0.00 
      
R-squared 0.52  0.83  0.87 
N 4536  3734  3734 
Log likelihood   -10247.43  -6295.45  -5527.76 
Durbin-Watson-
Stat. 
0.37 2.34 2.05 
Note: t-values in parentheses. Leads and lags are not reported in DOLS and DFGLS. The impact of aid was 
calculated as:  LBAID* X / D I A B =  LBAID*114/21.9. Exports and aid are in millions of current US$.   36
Table 3. Development aid and recipients’ exports in Sub-Saharan Africa  
   Common Intercept-














LYD 0.86***  0.90***  -0.08 
 (22.00)  (7.90)  (-0.25) 
LYR 1.15***  1.01***  1.06*** 
 (20.42)  (6.47)  (3.89) 
LYHD -2.85***  -2.87***  -1.50*** 
 (-20.64)  (-8.00)  (-2.78) 
LYHR 0.66***  0.46***  1.35*** 
 (9.49)  (2.59)  (3.07) 
LDIST -1.26***  -0.90***  --- 
 (-12.24)  (-3.00)  --- 
LBAID 0.09***  0.06  -0.03 
 (3.57)  (1.10)  (-0.70) 
LBAIDI 0.07  0.14  -0.12 
 (0.99)  (0.87)  (-1.06) 
LMAID 0.03***  0.01  0.00 
 (8.22)  (1.34)  (1.14) 
LXCHR -0.18***  -0.00  0.04 
 (-3.53)  (-0.01)  (0.71) 
CONTIG --- ---  ---- 
 ---  ---  --- 
COMLANG 0.88***  0.80**  --- 
 (7.70)  (2.30)  --- 
COLONY 1.46***  1.64*** --- 
 (8.95)  (3.61)  --- 
  common intercept (yes)  common intercept (yes)  dyadic effects (yes
  leads and lags (yes)  leads and lags (yes)  leads and lags (yes
Impact of aid in 
terms of US$ 
(rounded) 
0.31 0.00 0.00 
      
R-squared 0.42  0.77  0.86 
N 4344  3500  3500 
Log likelihood   -10048.36  -6219.14  -5425.30 
Durbin-Watson-
Stat. 
0.41 2.36 2.05 
Note: t-values in parentheses. Leads and lags are not reported in DOLS and DFGLS. The impact of aid was 
calculated as:  LBAID* X / D I A B =  LBAID*50.35/14.82. Exports and aid are in millions of current US$. 
 
   37
Table 4. Development aid and recipients’ exports in Asia 
   Common Intercept-














LYD 0.82***  0.69***  0.77*** 
 (26.46)  (5.79)  (4.94 
LYR 0.80***  1.00***  -0.37 
 (17.50)  (9.02)  (-1.43) 
LYHD -2.51***  -2.02***  0.15 
 (-22.14)  (-4.59)  (0.54) 
LYHR 1.24***  0.64***  1.90*** 
 (17.21)  (3.05)  (5.98) 
LDIST -1.17***  -0.93***  ---- 
 (-10.39)  (-2.33)  --- 
LBAID 0.24***  -0.01  -0.02 
 (14.52)  (-0.15)  (-1.01) 
LBAIDI 0.57***  0.13  -0.25*** 
 (7.29)  (1.23)  (-3.74) 
LMAID -0.00***  0.00 0.00 
 (-5.29)  (0.31)  (1.25) 
LXCHR -0.97***  -0.29  0.49*** 
 (-8.48)  (-1.42)  (5.66) 
CONTIG --- ---  --- 
 ---  ---  --- 
COMLANG 0.53***  0.07  --- 
 (6.00)  (0.20)  --- 
COLONY 0.37*** 0.48  --- 
 (4.55)  (1.15)  --- 
  common intercept (yes)  common intercept (yes)  dyadic effects (yes
  leads and lags (yes)  leads and lags (yes)  leads and lags (yes
Impact of aid in 
terms of US$ 
(rounded) 
5.56 0.00 0.00 
      
R-squared 0.82  0.97  0.98 
N 2991  2605  2605 
Log likelihood  -5075.80  -1989.26  -1401.35 
Durbin-Watson-
Stat. 
0.21 2.17 1.87 
Note: t-values in parentheses. Leads and lags are not reported in DOLS and DFGLS. The impact of aid was 
calculated as:  LBAID* X / D I A B =  LBAID*874/37.7. Exports and aid are in millions of current US$. 
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Table 5. Development aid and recipients’ exports in Latin America & Caribbean 
   Common Intercept-














LYD 0.66***  0.66***  0.55* 
 (19.35)  (5.34)  (1.86) 
LYR 0.88***  0.82***  0.20 
 (20.21)  (5.69)  (1.08) 
LYHD -1.34***  -1.62***  -0.53 
 (-9.19)  (-2.96)  (-1.27) 
LYHR 1.17***  1.09***  1.50*** 
 (6.08)  (2.50)  (3.51) 
LDIST -2.66***  -1.77***  --- 
 (-17.92)  (-2.66)  --- 
LBAID 0.38***  0.15***  0.03 
 (14.97)  (3.02)  (0.71) 
LBAIDI -0.12**  0.05  -0.04 
 (-2.04)  (0.43)  (-0.50) 
LMAID 0.01***  0.01***  -0.00 
 (5.78)  (2.85)  (-0.59) 
LXCHR 0.16***  0.01  0.03 
 (3.50)  (0.10)  (0.60) 
CONTIG --- ---  --- 
 ---  ---  --- 
COMLANG -0.29  1.05  --- 
 (-0.94)  (0.46)  --- 
COLONY 0.57*  -0.15  --- 
 (1.91)  (-0.07)  --- 
  common intercept (yes)  common intercept (yes)  dyadic effects (yes
  leads and lags (yes)  leads and lags (yes)  leads and lags (yes
Impact of aid in 
terms of US$ 
(rounded) 
4.14 1.63 0.00 
      
R-squared 0.61  0.92  0.94 
N 3985  3579  3579 
 Log likelihood  -7965.84  -4326.08  -3835.54 
Durbin-Watson-
Stat. 
0.23 2.19 1.96 
Note: t-values in parentheses. Leads and lags are not reported in DOLS and DFGLS. The impact of aid was 
calculated as:  LBAID* X / D I A B =  LBAID*135/12.4. Exports and aid are in millions of current US$. 
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Table 6       Macroeconomic transmission channels (the long-run view) 






Real exchange rate 
channel 
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yes yes yes 
Fixed 
effects 
yes yes yes 
R




1.93 1.85 2.18 
Note: t-values in parentheses. DFGLS estimation is basically a DOLS estimation in which we correct for 
autocorrelation. All variables are in logarithms.  INY=investment-to-GDP ratio; DSY=domestic savings-to-GDP 
ratio; XCHR=real exchange rate (increase stands for depreciation; XCHR=100 in the year 2000); EXTNSY=net 
external savings (minus ODA)-to-GDP ratio; AIDY=net ODA-to-GDP ratio. AR(1)=first order autocorrelation 
of the disturbances.  
We have tested for the macroeconomic transmission channels controlling for endogeneity and autocorrelation. 
For this purpose, we have applied a fixed effects Dynamic Feasible Generalized Least Squares (DFGLS) 
estimation
20, adding leads and lags of the explanatory variables in first differences to equations 5 to 7. 
                                                           
20 Wooldridge (2009) explains how strictly exogenous explanatory variables are generated by inserting leads and 
lags of the first-differenced variables.   40
  APPENDIX 
 
Figure a. Net ODA disbursements by income group of recipient country. 1988-2007 
 
Source: OECD   41
Table A1. Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
BAID 35003  2.21E+07  1.22E+08 -1.77E+07  1.12E+10 
BAIDI 35003  3.85E+08  8.27E+08 -9520000 2.18E+10 
MAID 46508  4.94E+09  1.43E+10 -5.53E+10  8.17E+11 
X 26615  2.71E+08  1.83E+09 1  1.02E+11 
M 36843  2.62E+08  1.98E+09 1 1.28E+11 
        
XCHR 47250  118.9089  117.8249 0.0129694 2939.103 
YD 51660  1.13E+12  2.05E+12 3.67E+10  1.38E+13 
YR 49791  4.82E+10  1.66E+11 2.84E+07  3.38E+12 
YHD 51660  24404.99  7330.851 9279.041 53432.5 
YHR 47628  4738.044  7054.332 111.5047  64512.3 
        
DIST 51660  7759.54  3791.68 270.6798  18953.23 
        
LBAID 34921  14.49717  2.491744 9.21034  23.14166 
LBAIDI 34983  5.083094  1.444329 -4.605338  9.991882 
LMAID 46508  4.941066  14.30616 -55.34  816.63 
LX 26615  15.54073  3.500141 0  25.34885 
LM 36843  15.46038  3.423805 0  25.57454 
        
LXCHR 49476  4.683498  1.122653 -4.345165  14.98787 
LYD 51660  26.79275  1.315216 24.32498  30.25216 
LYR 49791  22.65125  1.973622 17.16239  28.84957 
LYHD 51660  10.05753  0.3025221 9.135513 10.88617 
LYHR 47628  7.812596  1.125598 4.714067 11.07461 
        




Table A2. Results from panel unit root tests 
Variable ADF-Fisher  Chi-square  test 
statistics 
P-value 
LX 1348.87***  1.00 
LYD 1368.53***  1.00 
LYR 1061.61***  1.00 
LYHD 1008.35***  1.00 
LYHR 1109.81***  1.00 
LXCHR 4089.67***  1.00 
LBAID 2843.95**  0.95 
LBAIDI 2041.31***  1.00 
LMAID 2265.71***  1.00 
Note: Null hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root process);  
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Table A3. Results from Kao’s panel cointegration test  
 
 
Series in cointegration relationship: LX LD LR LHD LHR LXCHR LBAID LBAIDI 
LMAID 
 t-statistic  P-value 
DF -27.90  0.00 
DF* -10.68  0.00 
Note: Null hypothesis: No cointegration; trend assumption: No deterministic trend; automatic lag length 




Table A4: List of countries 
List of recipients 
(j)  130      
List of 
Donors (i)  21
Afghanistan 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. Jamaica  Peru  Australia     
Albania  Congo, Rep.  Jordan  Philippines  Austria    
Algeria  Costa Rica  Kazakstan  Qatar  Belgium    
Angola  Cote d'Ivoire  Kenya  Rwanda  Canada    
Argentina Croatia  Kiribati  Samoa Denmark     
Armenia  Cuba  Korea  Saudi Arabia  Finland    
Aruba Djibouti  Kuwait  Senegal  France     
Azerbaijan Dominica 
Laos Dem. 
Rep. Seychelles  Germany     
Bahamas 
Dominican 
Republic  Lebanon  Sierra Leone  Greece    
Bahrain Ecuador  Lesotho  Somalia  Ireland     
Bangladesh  Egypt  Liberia  South Africa  Italy    
Barbados  El Salvador  Libya  Sri Lanka  Japan    
Belarus Eritrea  Madagascar  Sudan  Netherlands     
Belize   Malawi  Suriname 
New 
Zealand    
Benin Ethiopia  Malaysia  Swaziland  Norway     
Bermuda Fiji  Mali  Syria  Portugal     
Bhutan Gabon  Mauritania  Taiwan  Spain     
Bolivia Gambia  Mauritius  Tanzania  Sweden     
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Georgia  Mexico  Thailand  Switzerland     
Botswana Ghana Moldova  Timor-Leste 
United 
States    
Brazil Grenada  Mongolia  Togo 
United 
Kingdom    
Brunei  Guatemala  Morocco  Tonga       
Burkina Faso  Guinea  Mozambique
Trinidad and 
Tobago         43
Burundi  Guinea-Bissau  Myanmar  Tunisia       
Cambodia  Guyana  Namibia  Turkey       
Cameroon  Haiti  Nepal  Uganda       
Cape Verde  Honduras  Nicaragua 
United Arab 
Emirates       
Central African 
Republic    Niger  Uruguay       
Chad  India  Nigeria  Venezuela       
Chile  Indonesia  Oman  Vietnam       
China  Iran  Pakistan  Yemen       
Colombia  Iraq  Panama  Zambia       
Comoros  Israel  Paraguay  Zimbabwe       
Note: Seven countries were automatically dropped from the analysis due to an 
insufficient number of observations when running the regressions. 